

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHEASTERN DIVISION**

DEREK BRUCE HOPKINS,)
Plaintiff,)
v.)
MATHEW MICHEL,)
Defendant.)
No. 1:23-cv-00199-RHH

OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on self-represented plaintiff Derek Bruce Hopkins' application to proceed in the district court without prepaying fees or costs. Having reviewed the application and the financial information submitted in support, the Court finds plaintiff lacks sufficient funds to pay the entire filing fee, and will assess an initial partial filing fee of \$1.00. Furthermore, after initial review, the Court will dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Initial Partial Filing Fee

A prisoner bringing a civil action is required to pay the full amount of the filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). If the prisoner has insufficient funds in his prison account to pay the entire fee, the Court must assess and, when funds exist, collect an initial partial filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of (1) the average monthly deposits in the prisoner's account, or (2) the average monthly balance in the prisoner's account for the prior six-month period. After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner is required to make monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month's income credited to the prisoner's account. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The agency

having custody of the prisoner will forward these monthly payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the prisoner's account exceeds \$10, until the filing fee is fully paid. *Id.*

Plaintiff has not submitted an inmate account statement as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). Nevertheless, having reviewed the information contained in the application, the Court will require plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of \$1.00. *See Henderson v. Norris*, 129 F.3d 481, 484 (8th Cir. 1997). If plaintiff is unable to pay the initial partial filing fee, he must submit a copy of his inmate account statement in support of his claim.

Legal Standard on Initial Review

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim for relief, which is more than a “mere possibility of misconduct.” *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” *Id.* at 678. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw upon judicial experience and common sense. *Id.* at 679. The court must “accept as true the facts alleged, but not legal conclusions or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” *Barton v. Taber*, 820 F.3d 958, 964 (8th Cir. 2016); *see also Brown v. Green Tree Servicing LLC*, 820 F.3d 371, 372-73 (8th Cir. 2016) (stating that court must accept factual allegations in complaint as true, but is not required to “accept as true any legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”).

When reviewing a pro se complaint under § 1915(e)(2), the Court must give it the benefit of a liberal construction. *Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A “liberal construction” means that if the essence of an allegation is discernible, the district court should construe the plaintiff’s complaint in a way that permits his or her claim to be considered within the proper legal framework. *Solomon v. Petray*, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015).

The Complaint

Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee currently incarcerated at the Mississippi County Detention Center. He brings this civil rights action against Ripley County Prosecutor Mathew Michel, alleging constitutional violations arising out of prosecutorial misconduct. Plaintiff sues defendant in his official capacity only.

Plaintiff’s statement of facts states only that defendant had a conflict of interest due to an unspecified personal relationship from August 2004 through May 2007. Plaintiff alleges defendant should have removed himself from plaintiff’s pending criminal prosecution.

Discussion

Prosecutors are immune from 42 U.S.C. § 1983 liability so long as the actions complained of appear to be within the scope of prosecutorial duties. *Price v. Moody*, 677 F.2d 676, 677 (8th Cir. 1982). *See also Keating v. Martin*, 638 F.2d 1121, 1122 (8th Cir. 1980). The immunity enjoyed by prosecutors from § 1983 actions can be either absolute or qualified. *Brodnicki v. City of Omaha*, 75 F.3d 1261, 1266 (8th Cir. 1996). A prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity if he or she is acting as an advocate for the State in a criminal prosecution. *Id.* On the other hand, a prosecutor is entitled to only qualified immunity when he or she pursues actions in an “investigatory” or “administrative” capacity. *Id.*

“Absolute immunity protects prosecutors against claims arising from their initiation of a prosecution and presenting a criminal case insofar as that conduct is intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” *Sample v. City of Woodbury*, 836 F.3d 913, 916 (8th Cir. 2016). For instance, “[t]he acts of preparing, signing, and filing a criminal complaint constitute prosecutorial functions, as they are advocacy on behalf of the government.” *Schenk v. Chavis*, 461 F.3d 1043, 1046 (8th Cir. 2006).

Prosecutorial immunity depends on the functional nature of the prosecutor’s activities; therefore, immunity is not defeated by “allegations of improper motive in the performance of prosecutorial functions.” *Sample*, 836 F.3d at 916. Absolute immunity still applies even when there are allegations of malice, vindictiveness, or self-interest. *Reasonover v. City of St. Louis, Mo.*, 447 F.3d 569, 580 (8th Cir. 2006). The Eighth Circuit has stated that “[a]llegations of unethical conduct and improper motive in the performance of prosecutorial functions do not defeat the protections of absolute immunity.” *Sample*, 836 F.3d at 916 (8th Cir. 2016).

Plaintiff alleges only that defendant had a conflict of interest in plaintiff’s criminal prosecution “d[ue] to [a] personal relationship” and defendant “failed to remove himself from my case.” These allegations fall squarely within the scope of the absolute immunity doctrine applicable to prosecutors. For this reason, the Court will dismiss this action for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b).

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s application to proceed in the district court without prepayment of fees and costs is **GRANTED**. [ECF No. 2]

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff must pay an initial partial filing fee of \$1.00

within thirty (30) days of the date of this order. Plaintiff is instructed to make his remittance payable to "Clerk, United States District Court," and to include upon it: (1) his name; (2) his prison registration number; (3) the case number; and (4) the statement that the remittance is for an original proceeding.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's complaint is **DISMISSED without prejudice** for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's motion to appoint counsel is **DENIED** as moot. [ECF No. 3]

An Order of Dismissal will accompany this Opinion, Memorandum and Order.

Dated this 23rd day of February, 2024.



HENRY EDWARD AUTREY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE